Modes of financial development : American banking dynamics and world financial crises by DE CECCO, Marcello
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE
Department of Economics 320
ËUI
E U I  W O R K I N G  P A P E R  No.84/122
MODES OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT: 




This paper was written while the 
author was a member of the Institute 
for Advanced Study, Princeton.
It was presented at a Conference in 
honour of Albert 0. Hirschman held 
at the University of Notre Dame in 
April, 1984.



























































































All rights reserved 
No part of this paper may be 
reproduced in any form without 
permission of the author.
(C) Marcello de Cecco 
Printed in Italy in November 1984 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 




























































































MODES OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT:
AMERICAN BANKING DYNAMICS AND WORLD FINANCIAL CRISES
Introductory remarks. In this paper I try to suggest that, from a largely 
homogeneous theoretical and practical banking tradition, the different 
interaction of political and economic forces led the British and American 
banking systems to develop according to different modes. The American 
banking system, after a start which followed British lines, radically 
changed course in the Jacksonian era, and it has increased its differences 
from it, and from other major banking systems, as time has passed. The 
non-existence, in the U.S., of a strong coalition of lenders, and the 
structural bias of the country towards using more savings than it 
generated, blended with a banking theory and a legal tradition totally 
similar to the British ones, have modelled the U.S. banking system in a way 
which, if it has favored the fast growth of the American economy, has also 
given it a tendency to deep financial instability.
The structural imbalance of the American financial system has been a 
most important generator of crises of the international financial system in 
the last 150 years. In this paper I have given a rapid sketch of how 
American financial instability has recurred throughout the period and 
spread to the rest of the world finanical system. In a short piece like 
the present one, many questions are left unanswered and many links are 
missing. But the field is now being extensively ploughed by many able 
scholars, and more detailed and persuasive works will certainly appear in 




























































































My main aim is to show how the same cultural tradition can generate 
wildly different results, if applied to different socio-political and 
economic circumstances. Or, as Pasteur taught, that the receiving 
environment is even more important than the virus that infects it.
1. Even more than nuclear power and, of course, long before it, 
banking has been in the U. S. subject to extensive regulation. Like 
elsewhere regulation has been imposed on American banking by political 
forces. And, more often than not, regulation has been skillfully 
manipulated by some sectors o f the financial community so that it  may work 
to their own advantage, and to the detriment o f their competitors. In 
order to do this, industrialists, farmers and other large blocks o f the 
American political body have been used to serve the purposes of this or 
that section of the financial community. This, however, has been true of 
regulation in most countries. The interesting thing to discover is what 
interplay of political and economic forces led the American financial 
system to develop in a mode different from that according to which the 
financial system of other industrial countries developed. Equally 
interesting is to trace the impact of the peculiar mode of American 
financial development on the world financial and economic system.
Americans, and foreigners, still tend to think of the United States 
as a new country, with young institutions. But as far as banking is 
concerned, the United States has had an experience synchronous with that of 
every other developed country. Modern Banking developed on these shores 
exactly when it was developing in England; it therefore even preceded 




























































































and monetary theory, as the U. S. and Britain were a homogeneous 
intellectual community.
As to Central Banking, it is fair to say that in the U. S. it 
developed, in its most modern and accomplished form, before everywhere 
else. The First and the Second Bank of the United States resembled modern 
Central Banks more than the Bank of England of the early nineteenth century 
did.1
The Second Bank of the United States was partly owned by the Federal 
State, managed only secondarily for profit, and it acted as the Fiscal 
Agent of the Federal Government. A fter only a decade of existence, it had 
become one of the largest banks in the world. And it is generally 
recognized that the 1820s, the period in which the Bank of the United 
States was extending its operations, were, perhaps, before the 1940s and 
1950s, the quietest period in American banking history. The Bank of the 
United States successfully managed to control the State banks by checking 
their overissue of bank notes. It thus stabilized economic activity.
The United States Government, however, having scored a first in 
world financial history until the 1820s, proceeded, in the next decade, to 
destroy its own achievement, by denying the Bank of the United States a 
renewal of its Federal charter.
As of 1836, as a result, one of the lynchpins of Hamiltonian 
state-building and one of the most innovative ones, was destroyed. The
^ n  the first and second banks of the U.S., the locus classicus is Bray 




























































































United States had to wait until 1913 to have a central bank , and this time 
it was an institution different from all other central banks, the Federal 
Reserve System.
2. The coalition that brought about the demise of the Bank of the 
United States is worthy of careful study, as it was composed of the 
elements whose influence would set, and keep, the United States on its path 
of financial instability for much of the following period.
The masse de maneuvre o f the coalition were the farmers. Unlike its 
European counterpart, American agriculture was, since the early decades of 
the nineteenth century, a highly innovative and highly indebted sector of 
the economy. When we read the financial history of the main European 
countries, in particular British financial history, we are always treated 
to an account of savings flowing from agriculture to other sectors, 
industry in particular. A part of the rent which is extracted from 
agriculture is transferred, via financial intermediaries, to the industrial 
entrepreneurs and to the government. In the U.S., on the contrary, 
agriculture absorbs credit, to buy land and to make it yield its fruits. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, agriculture remains an innovative sector 
of the American economy and a highly capital intensive one. It is also the 
sector that absorbs the largest share o f manpower and the largest exporter. 
American farmers, like all farmers, would like to be paid in sound, stable 
money for their crops. But they would also like easy, freely flowing 
credit available on tap and at stable rates. It is this peculiar 
contradiction that makes the U.S. farmers the ready raw material for 
manipulation, on the part o f politicians and of adventurous financiers.2




























































































reasoned argument Bray Hammond develops, in his classic book, to prove that 
it was not the farmers, but other social forces, which fussed for free 
banking and cheap money in Colonial America and in the early decades of the 
Republic. My argument, however, is that the size and peculiar character of 
American farming made it easy prey to political manipulation because it 
had, by its nature, to take a contradictory position vis-à-vis banks credit 
and currency. As a result o f their needing long-term loans and at the same 
time payment for their crops in sound money, American farmers' allegiances 
could be made to swing between "cheap money" "no banks" and "sound 
currency." That they were the most powerful force in the political arena 
is undeniale, and the mutual inconsistency of their needs was used by other 
forces to obtain political actions, with regard to banking and currency, 
which, if they did not benefit farmers, still were achieved with their 
essential support.
I would therefore heavily qualify some of Hammond's stronger statements 
on the issue. The farmers' support could be won in campaigns against banks 
and in favor of a gold currency, essentially because farmers were convinced 
that credit, as administered by American banks was not o f the revolving 
type they needed—and not because they were against credit per se. American 
banks would solicit loans to farmers, in times of high prices, and 
foreclose on them in times of low prices. Still, the need for loans was 
there. Credit was essential to American agriculture but could not be given 
on terms farmers could find equitable. At the same time, the vagaries of 
crop prices were often attributed to unsound currency, hence the farmers' 
attention to sound currency campaigns.
These contradictions are not exclusively experienced by American 
society. Albert O. Hirschman has written, in his The Passions and the 
Interests, some very illuminating passages on the problem of the 
"mobilization" of land control in 18th century France. And the very high 
capital intensity and reliance on credit of American farming was noticed 
from the very early decades of the 19th century. As will be noted by 
looking at the appended Tables, while in Britain agriculture had already 
fallen to employing a very low share of total labor by 1841j ^n America it 
kept swelling in absolute terms as an employer, and maintained its share of 
total employment, between 1820 and 1870. (See Tables enclosed). American 
farmers had to rely on credit exactly because so many people still became 
farmers, and had to buy land and then the capital to work it. In his 
spendid book on American agriculture (Change in Agriculture, Harvard,
1968), Clarence Danhof tells us very clearly with many references to 
contemporary sources, how generalized farmers' indebtedness was as early as 
1830. He conveys very well the feeling of need and at the same time, of 
hatred the farmer had for the banker, from the very start of the 19th 
century, and the contradiction between easy money and hard currency, two 
things the farmers wanted at the same time. That is why I have used the 
expression "masse de maneuvre" in the text.
To contrast European agriculture with its pressure of people on the 
land, with its high rents, hence with its inevitable financial surpluses, 
with American agriculture, perhaps the most dynamic sector throughout 
American economic history, with its low rents, high rate of owner-workers, 
and the resulting net absorption of financial resources, is the basis to 




























































































The Bank of the United States, because o f the financial 
underdevelopment o f the agricultural states, soon gained a foothold there.
It helped to move the crops, in particular cotton, and put itself between 
the Southern farmers, the Eastern merchants and bankers, and the English 
financial institutions which financed the exports of cotton to its users in 
Lancashire. In its conservative management of the American paper currency, 
the Bank of the United States was, at one and the same time, exercising a 
restraining influence on the farmers, on its Eastern banking competitors 
and on the Bank of England, whose coffers it tended to deprive o f gold.
But these were potential enemies, and before they were mobilized, Congress 
renewed its charter. The Congressional decision, however, was vetoed by 
President Andrew Jackson, who had been elected on a platform which included 
a return to a sound metal-based currency, and a drastic decrease o f the 
regulatory influence of Government, and took advice from enterprising 
financiers like Kendall and Van Buren. One year after the scrapping o f the 
Federal Bank, the world experienced the first full scale financial crisis 
of predominantly American domestic origins. In order to deliver on his 
electoral promises, President Jackson had not only vetoed the renewal of 
the Federal charter for the Bank of the United States. He had also ruled 
that all sales of Federal land be paid for in gold, that the surplus of the
of Bray Hammond's exhortation not to project back on the earlier age the 
accusation of "cheap money advocates" farmers received in the last part of 
the 19h century and in the early decades of the 20th. This position is 
simply not sensible. Other authoritative sources, like Danhof and his 
references, prove the early indebtedness, and thus the contradictory 




























































































Federal budget be redistributed to the States, and that the fiscal revenue 
of the Federal Government be deposited with a large number of banks, the 
so-called "pet banks," many of which were owned by government supporters. 
From the point of view of monetary management, a series of financial 
measures nearer to pure folly would be difficult to imagine. The 
scattering of financial ammunitions, which had been so wisely centralized 
before, resulted in an immediate run on the banks and a suspension of 
specie payments on their part when the Bank of England cut the American 
banks' discount facilities in London.
The clique o f financiers which had skillfully manipulated the 
actions of General Jackson thus managed to destroy their main competitor 
and to move the financial center of the country to Wall Street from 
Philadelphia. But it did so at the cost o f engendering a world crisis, 
whose worst effects were experienced in the cotton producing South of the 
U.S. and in the cotton using North of England. They also re-established 
freedom of banking operations but at the cost o f precipitating the country 
into a financial anarchy which, if it was useful to promoters, speculators 
and robber barons, and thus to the fast growth o f the U.S. economy, 
definitely wove the pattern of 150 years of world financial instability.
It is worth asking why the Bank of the United States had so few 
friends. Part of the answer must surely be found in its peculiar charter.
It was owned in part by the Government and in part by private investors, 
some of them foreigners. It could not, as a result, be described as a 
public agency, to be defended as part o f the Constitution. But its main 




























































































coalition o f landed aristocracy, who provided a part o f the capital, of 
gentry and middle class savers, who provided another part, and merchant 
bankers of the city of London, who managed the bank, staffing the Court of 
Directors, and electing from it the Governor.3 With a coalition like that 
behind it, the Bank of England could stand the repeated attacks that 
Northern industrialists, country bankers and farmers waged against it in 
the same years when Nicholas Biddle and his Bank of the United States 
succumbed to Andrew Jackson and his chequered but unbeatable army of 
banking adventurers, who could mobilize the ill feelings of the indebted 
farmers. Deprived of its Federal Charter, the Bank of the U.S. could have 
re-emerged in a purely private incarnation, and run the U.S. banking 
system by the force of its sheer size. This was the course adopted, after 
all, by the Bank of England in the next thirty to forty years in order to 
keep its primacy. But Biddle could not rely on a coalition of savers. He 
thus tried to beat his adversaries at their own game. He attempted to 
corner the cotton market and to bring about a general suspension of cash 
payments. He failed in both enterprises, thus showing, as would be often 
shown in the future, that Central Bankers are not very successful when they 
try their hand at being real financial adventurers.
John Law's adventures in France can be read in much the same vein. 
But, apart from this personal failure, the structural reason for the 
failure of the B.U.S. is that it was created without a natural
^On the Bank of England's shareholders, see J. Capham, The Bank of 




























































































constituency, just when the country was at a watershed of its history, and 
was embarking upon the dazzling development o f the huge American continent. 
How could an institution imitating that great coalition of savers and 
lenders, the Bank of England, succeed in a country where, for many future 
decades, borrowers prevailed?
In fact, perhaps the most useful interpretative key to the financial 
instability which the U.S. has shown through a great part o f its history is 
the dynamism of the American development process. Financial stability 
depends on the existence of a consolidated coalition of creditors. How 
could such a coalition form and thrive in a country where land was not 
scarce, especially because o f a moving frontier, and where development 
continuously changed the game, the place where it was played, the people it 
suddenly made rich?
After the dismantling of the first experiment at financial 
centralism, in the 1830's, the oscillations of political coalitions formed 
to deal with banks and banking resulted in a complete fragmentation of the 
American banking system. The fragmentation was increased by the 
establishment of the Independent Treasury which centralized Government 
revenue and had no officially devised way of re-cycling it back to the 
banking system. This was because it had been designed to fulfill the 
voters' dream of ridding the bankers of Federal Money, over which they may 
spin a web of unfair control.
The Independent Treasury managed to make the Federal Gold Reserve 
virtually unusable, and a net hindrance on the working of the national and 




























































































recycled to the economy. The system thus needed a much higher quantity of 
gold to keep moving than it would have needed without the Independent 
Treasury.
The fragmentation of the American financial system which followed 
the 1830s and the lack of a lender o f last resort joined with the rise of 
the powerful American export agriculture, to create another structural 
problem: the so-called seasonal fluctuations in the demand for cash. This
lasted until the first world war and even beyond it.
Every summer, crops were moved from the farming States to the East 
or to foreign countries. Cash would move the other way to pay the farmers, 
thus depriving New York of its funds and sending the interest rate to very 
high levels. As there was no central bank, the financial stategy was 
communicated to the rest of the world. The Bank of England, which, in 
order to behave as a normal, profit making institution, subsisted on the 
smallest possible gold reserve, would put up its Bank Rate, and hope that 
money would come from Europe, so that it may be sent to New York to relieve 
the dearth o f funds that was experienced there
Whenever bad luck ordained that another negative factor intervene, 
in the U.S., or elsewhere, at the time o f the Autumn Drain, a major 
financial crisis would break out.
This annual pattern of financial stringency, which shook the world 
financial system with weather-like periodicity, could not be altered as
^On the seasonal fluctuations and their consequences, the reader can be 





























































































long as the American financial system remained without a center which may 
function as lender o f last resort.
We can safely say that the lender of last resort function is one of 
the most unambiguously defined public functions, as it is certain that it 
cannot be efficiently performed by a profit maximizing institution. In 
times of crisis the lender o f last resort has to provide funds, at punitive 
rates, to borrowers in need, against collateral o f acceptable quality so 
that the banking system may not contract too adversely or even collapse.
The essential features of the function are, first, that the institution 
which performs it must be generally known to have unlimited funds at its 
disposal. And second, that the operation must be performed quickly, with 
only scant probability of inspecting the quality of the property accepted 
as collateral. A fter the crisis period is passed, therefore, this paper 
may take a long time in being liquidated.^
Hence the impossibility for a profit maximizing bank to perform this 
function without endangering its profitability. Hence the very marked 
difficulty the Bank of England encountered in performing it every year.
What happened in practice was that, aware of the peculiar structure o f the 
U.S. banking system, and of the inevitable recurrence of the so-called 
autumn drains, the Bank of England would protect its gold reserve by 
devices which amounted to partial inconvertibility, or to a fluctuating 
gold-sterling rate. In the twenty-five years before 1914, the Bank of 
England could also rely on the reserves the Indian Empire earned in world 
markets and was compelled to hold as deposits in London.
h i  we make use of one of Albert O. Hirschman's most useful contributions 
to economic thought, the lender of last resort function can be considered 




























































































In the 1860s the American banking system was reformed, with the 
passage of the National Banking act. It was a further step in the process 
of differentiation of the American financial sytem from those of the main 
European countries. Like many monetary reforms, it was the product of war 
finance and outmoded monetary theory.^ It tried to bring all banks under 
National, i.e., Federal, charter, by imposing a punitive tax on State bank 
notes. All National bank notes were to be secured by Federal obligations. 
But no Central Bank was provided, to give elasticity to the money supply. 
And no rules were given to regulate the creation of deposits, the more 
modern banking device. And individual States were still allowed to charter 
banks. As a result, the dual banking system was founded, which exists even 
today.
Thus in the decades before the end of the century, while the U.S. 
economy advanced by leaps and bounds to become the largest and richest in 
the world, the American banking system grew as fast as the economy, but 
according to a model different from that according to which the major 
European financial systems were developing.
predicated by the market system. To be exercised wisely, the lender of 
last resort function, in fact, requires that, first of all, "ex it" that is 
to say bankruptcy, be suspended, and funds be advanced against collateral 
of an illiquid nature, i.e. against the normal rules of banking conduct.
The intervention of this Central Bank, that is to say, is meant to save the 
money market as an essential institution, against its short-run 
illiquidity. By negating the "exit" rules in the case of a crisis, the 
Central Bank ensures that they remain in existence in normal times, when 
their operation may prove useful for the economic system's general 
efficiency. It was, in fact Albert Hirschman, who in his Strategy of 
Economic Devlopment, called the central banker a sort of honorary member of 
the market forces, (p. 64, footnote).
^On the Act, see Eugene N. White's excellent The Regulation and Reform of 




























































































The National Banking Act forbade branching, with the result that 
small banks mushroomed everywhere, while some New York and Chicago banks 
reached gigantic size. The small banks, following what the Act prescribed, 
deposited funds with the large ones, and these funds, which were considered 
as reserves by the small banks, were either invested by the large banks in 
stock exchange speculation or lent on short-term, to the stock exchange 
speculators. Thus what the small banks considered as their reserves were 
funds which were lent for the most risky and unstable use. When a cloud 
appeared over the financial horizon, this system would contract credit as 
fast as it had expanded it. Small banks would call in their loans to large 
banks, and large banks would recall their loans from the stock exchange 
brokers. As a multiplier was in operation, there was not enough money to 
satisfy every bank that claimed its funds back. Interest rates soared, the 
Stock Exchange plunged, and in the absence of a lender o f the last resort, 
money was supposed to come from abroad to re-establish equilibrium.
The proneness to crisis of this inverted financial pyramid increased 
as the financial sophistication o f the country increased. We have to 
remember that financial sophistication is not necessarily by itself 
conducive to the balanced growth o f the economy. Quite to the contrary, it 
is an attempt, on the part of financial operators, to maximize the volume 
of transactions with respect to basic financial resources. And this, while 
it induces fast growth, also causes deep cyclical oscillations. In the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century and in the years before the Great 
War, fast technological advances united the United States to a degree it 



























































































was tremendous. But this, for the financial system, only meant that small 
banks could proliferate even more than before, and that the whole system 
could be united by a web of inter-bank deposits which, being the system 
still headless, increased the rate of credit expansion but also that of 
credit contraction.
The co-existence of very small banks and very large banks 
contributed to instability by giving depositors little trust in small 
banks, to which they were lured by high deposit rates. Competition drove 
the cost of inter-bank deposits high and encouraged large banks to lend 
funds to lucrative but risky stock exchange adventures. Large banks were 
not in favor of a branch banking reform that may squeeze the small banks 
out because by their existence the fixed costs implied by branch banking 
were avoided. Large banks would solicit inter-bank deposits when they 
needed them and get rid of them when they did not.
In this period, banking was being extended to larger and larger 
sections of the population, thus involving people who could be easily 
exploited but who also more easily got frightened and wanted their money 
back, if the shadow of a panic appeared.
And panics were frequent. Between the establishment of the National 
Banking System and the First World War there was a panic every ten years, 
with an increase in frequency towards the end o f the period. They ushered 
in widespread bank failures and industrial depression, and would spread 
quickly to the rest of the world, as transatlantic communications had 





























































































3. If we compare financial development in the U.S. in the two 
decades preceding the Great War with financial development in Europe, we 
find that a common feature to all national experiences was the rise of 
large banks. But, while in Europe banks became large by establishing huge 
national branch networks, in the U.S. banks became large by increasing the 
size of their wholesale operations, on the asset side, and by getting more 
and more interbank deposits from small banks, on the liability side.
There was, therefore, in the U.S., a growth o f financial instability 
associated with the rise of large banks, as they engaged in fierce 
oligopoly battles for customers and for funds and did not have any Central 
Bank to restrain them or to get them out o f the trouble in which they 
placed themselves frequently.
In addition, those were the decades when trust companies grew in the 
U.S. to challenge the operations of large banks unfettered by even the 
scant controls the National Banking System exercised on federally chartered 
banks. Financial innovation, in the form of the enormous development o f 
stock exchange transactions, favored the peculiar type o f financial 
development the U.S. experienced in this period.
Rapid financial innovation, together with the diffusion of growth 
and with improvement in communications, coupled with the interest o f the 
large financial institutions in maintaining the institutional status quo 
would, however, not be enough to explain a course of financial development 
which was peculiar to the U.S. As I said earlier, in all major European 
countries branch banking had spread to the remotest corners, and Central 





























































































The degree of autonomy of the banking system from the political world 
varied according to the countries. But the banking structure prevailing 
everywhere was the same.
One has, therefore, to look again at the peculiar political 
coalition prevailing in the U.S., and to the even more peculiar regulation 
it imposed and maintained on banking if one wants to explain the different 
course financial development took in the U.S. in the four decades preceding 
the First World War. As I said, branch banking was, in fact, almost 
universally prohibited, at State and Federal levels. And the prohibition 
suited very well the local interests politicians were inclined to bow to, 
as it would allow enterprising individuals to try their hands at banking. 
Deposit insurance was the answer to the riskiness o f this course of 
financial development, and it was duly adopted in several states, after the 
panic of 1907.
The main feature of the dual banking system, created by the National 
Banking Act and still in function today, was and is that it allows banks to 
arbitrage between Federal and State regulations in the search for an 
optimal result which will not necessarily agree with public welfare or 
macroeconomic stability.7 I do not want to convey to you that the European 
mode of financial development had no problems. In its British incarnation, 
for instance, which is the one morphologically nearest to the American, it 
witnessed, in the 25 years before the First War, the great and increasing 
difficulties of the Bank of England to organize a working relationship with




























































































the giant clearing banks which had resulted from the merger movement.
These banks were a new force in the traditional City landscape. They were 
outside the sancta sanctorum of British finance and threatened to organize 
themselves in a way that would do away with the services o f the Bank of 
England. As lender of last resort this function was performed by the Bank 
of England with increasing difficulty because the Bank had to maximize 
profits and to keep a large gold reserve, which reduced profitability. The 
bank also threatened to invade the field of operations of the Merchant 
Banks, from whom the directors of the Bank of England and its governors 
were chosen. The crisis of July, 1914, showed how advanced was the 
degradation of the British financial system's control network. On the news 
of Sarajevo, and before war had broken out, the clearing banks organized a 
run on the City, by withdrawing money from the Stock Exchange and even by 
trying to get gold from the Bank of England.
But, again, the coalition, which stood behind the inner sanctum of 
the City, intervened powerfully and swiftly to rap the uncouth clearing 
banks' fingers and to rescue the Bank of England and the Merchant Banks 
with all the weight of the British Government. From the minutes of the
"crisis conferences" Lloyd-George held to stem the financial panic, the
»
picture emerges clearly of the financially powerful but politically 
unprotected Clearing Bankers being pushed back into their placed
Not very differently had they been treated a quarter of a century 
before, at the time of the Baring Crisis. It is worth noting, moreover,




























































































that on the same occasion, July 1914, there was wild financial panic on 
Wall Street. The stock market collapsed, the foreign exchange market was 
closed. Bond prices sawk. The finance of foreign trade virtually ceased.
And the U.S. was not involved in the war.
4. In 1914, the Federal Reserve Act had been in force for one year, 
but in spite o f its formal passage, the new control structure it had 
created would not start to operate until November 16, 1914. Consequently, 
it had not been able to avert the panic in July 1914 which, as in previous 
cases, preceded the crisis in London and contributed decisively to its 
outbreak and added to its gravity. It was in fact on learning that the 
markets had closed in New York that the British Clearing Bankers took 
fright, as London was New York's largest creditor and the interruption of 
transactions there meant that London Merchant Banks and other financial 
institutions would not be able to recover the short term funds they had 
lent to New York in the immediate future.
The Federal Reserve System was once more the product o f a compromise 
between the main political and economic forces in the U.S.9
A fter the panic of 1907, a large coalition had formed in favor of 
financial reform. Prominent in the coalition however, were the proponents 
of the real bills doctrine, a banking theory fallacious but capable of 
attracting the fervor o f industrialists, small bankers and farmers.
The real bills doctrine's main contention is that banking will be 
conducted without problems, if bank loans are supported by real bills, that





























































































is to say, if money is lent on the collateral o f paper proving a real 
mercantile transaction, which will be "self-liquidating". Of course, Henry 
Thornton, as early as 1807 had proved the fallacious nature of the 
doctrine, showing how the same sum of money could be used to finance a very 
large number of real bills, thus causing an uncontrollable expansion of 
credit. What was really at issue was, o f course, the Central Bank's power 
to exercise quantitative control of Credit. Real bill proponents 
maintained that quantitative control was impossible and that quality 
control over the real transactions which credit financed was all that 
mattered.^ 0
As everyone is against bad debts and everyone thinks his own debt is 
good and socially necessary while the next guy's debt is bad, the real 
bills doctrine has traditionally been a great social catalyst. A battle 
was fought over it in Britain in the first half o f the nineteenth century, 
but the real bill supporters were effectively  incapacitated as a political 
force by Peel's Act and never recovered since essentially because of the 
political weakness of industrialists country bankers and small farmers. In 
the U.S., however, the charm of the real bills doctrine still worked. The 
1907 crisis had awakened the public to the extremes of financial 
speculation and people were therefore inclined to believe a doctrine that 
maintained that there was nothing wrong with any quantity of credit the 
banks generated provided it financed honest and productive transactions, 
and not the financial speculations of stock exchange promoters.
10it is interesting to note that among American writers on banking and 
currency problems. A strong predominance exists, since the earliest times, 
and until quite late in the 20th century, of supporters of the real bills
doctrine. This has been noticed, and exaustively commented upon, by the 




























































































The Federal Reserve Act was, as a result, based on the prin-ciples 
of free banking, of qualitative credit controls, o f the choice by bankers 
between State Banking and Federal Banking. In the spirit o f pluralism, it 
also mandated that no less than 12 Federal Reserve Banks be set up. And to 
cap it all, the Federal Reserve Act incorporated the United States' 
adherence to a rigid version o f the Gold Standard, such as it had never 
functioned anywhere in the world.
With such internally contradictory foundations, the new system began 
to operate, after the big parenthesis of War and War Finance, in a way that 
helped induce and certainly did not prevent the financial crises of 1920,
1929, 1930, 1932 and 1933.
5. If we compare the performance of the Federal Reserve System with that 
of its predecessor, we must draw a prima facie conclusion that the 
inter-war performance was even worse than the pre-war one. This may be
both remarked on the Scarcity of Quantity Theory Supporters among American 
economists. This can be contrasted with the British literature, but is not 
very different from German experience in the same period, as analyzed for 
instance, by H. Ellis in his German Montetary Theory. There does not seem 
to have been however, an American version of the Stratliche Theorie des 
Gelades. Early American banking writers seem to often devote a lot o f 
attention to the credit problems of farmers. And it is interesting to see 
how they manage to reconcile the farmers' credit needs and the real bills 
doctrine, with its insistence on "self-liquidation." Eligibility of 
agarian paper for rediscount would overcome most real bill supporters' 
requirements, such was its political importance, and be specifically 
mentioned in the most important pieces of U.S. banking legislation. See, 
for the relevant literature, L. Mints, A History of Banking Theory in 
Great Britain and the United States, Chicago, 1945, and H. Miller,
Banking Theory in the United States Before 1860, Harvard, 1927, to be 





























































































unfair, because the structural problems of the international economic 
system, and in particular of the American economy, were far greater in the 
inter-war period.
Some of these problems are so well known and so well studied that it 
would be useless to go over them again. For my purposes here, however, it 
is useful to focus on one aspect o f the inter-war scene which has received 
less attention. In the 1920's and early 1930's, the American banking 
system went through one of its most dynamic phases. The instability of 
Europe in this period, added to the huge demand for credit on the part of 
European and Latin American countries, found large American banks ready to 
take up the challenge. We must appreciate that in the 1920's the demand 
for bank loans on the part o f American corporations declined very 
substantially, as they found it more profitable to finance themselves out 
of retained profits and to finance their sales by trade credit and cash 
discounts.!*
At the same time, a whole new world had opened up for American banks 
in personal financial management. Because of the extremely large gains all 
sectors of the American economy had made by supplying first all European 
warring nations and then the Allies, a new dimension of prosperity had been 
reached, and milllions of American citizens were now in a position where 
they had money saved and money to be invested.
The banks, especially the large banks, had acquired expertise in 
dealing with this new demand when they had been given the task o f retailing
H i have dealt at greater length with this subject in "The International 
Debt Problem in the Inter-War Period" in Miles Kahler, (ed.) The 





























































































Liberty Bonds and then government war debts. A fter the war they found it 
very profitable to maintain and increase this activity by selling the same 
clientele foreign bonds and by entering en masse the field of trust and 
security operations. Large American banks, in the same years, also began 
to attract short-term deposits from, and to make short term loans to, 
foreign individuals and governments. In this period, as a result, we see 
the American banking system, and in particular, its most dynamic 
components, become at the same time international bankers and investment 
bankers. The Federal Reserve Act, much more than the National Banking Act, 
had been a product of large banks' pressure on their traditional allies.
Having satisfied the other partners o f the coalition with the offa l o f the 
real bills doctrine and the twelve Reserve Banks, the Act went a long way 
towards giving the large money market banks more than proportional 
representation in the twelve Federal Reserve Banks' open market committees 
and on the Board of Governors.
It is thus natural that, in the '20s and early '30s, the monetary 
policy of the United States was motivated by the needs of the banking 
community, as perceived by large money market bankers.
The level of interest rates thus became heavily influenced by the 
need to maintain the values of their security portfolios which was common 
to all banks and to keep a hold on the notoriously volatile and 
interest-elastic foreign short-term deposits, a need especially fe lt by 
large money market banks. Thus in the 1920's, the American large banks 
happily lent to foreign governments and other public and private foreign 




























































































expand their trust and securities operations with American families. And, 
starting in 1928, they switched to domestic stocks and bonds placements, 
stoking the fires of the Wall Street boom and at the same time inducing, by 
the sudden withdrawal of loans, the default o f their foreign customers.
European financial turmoil and major banking crisis followed in 
1931. The sudden drop of foreign demand for American goods which the 
drying up of American foreign loans induced reverberated upon American 
industry and was an important cause of the Depression. But it is fair to 
say that, in an attempt to prevent the withdrawal o f foreign balances which 
was one o f the results of the cessation o f American loans abroad, the 
Federal Reserve put up interest rates and thus busted the Wall Street boom. 
In the following years interest rates were kept high, in spite o f the huge 
fall in economic activity, because to have lowered them would have meant to 
decrease the banks' profitability and to accelerate the flight from the 
dollar, which was taking place after the devaluation of Sterling. Foreign 
owners of sterling balances, scalded by the experience, expected the same 
fate for their dollar balances.
6. The New Deal Banking legislation is commonly credited with the 
"reining in" of banks. But it does not seem to have been capable o f giving 
the American economy a stable financial system. Stability in this field 
was achieved in the 1940s and 1950s, but this came largely because the 
banks were innundated with War Bonds and transformed, for a long time, into 
rentiers. This, however, was not true of all banks, but mainly of



























































































into foreign operations, to gain a competitive edge on the rest o f the 
financial system.
With the return of the Western financial system to convertibility, 
in the late fifties, and with the start o f the Great American inflation, a 
few years later, the large banks found themselves exposed to external as 
well as internal threats.12 Convertibility had revived the possibility of 
arbitrage, i.e., o f shifting funds between financial centers following 
interest differentials and of international speculation based on exchange 
rate changes. The large banks thus found themselves exposed to sudden 
withdrawals of foreign-owned balances if  American interst rates went, for 
purely domestic reasons, out of alignment with foreign ones.
The Great American Inflation meant that the financial resources of 
the United States grew at very high speed. ^  The large banks found 
themselves at a disadvantage vis à vis non-bank financial intermediaries as 
they were saddled with reserve requirements. Against small local banks 
they had difficulty in competing, as they were deprived o f branches to 
attract deposits and generally to look after the financial needs of 
provincial communities enriched by the migration of industry and populated 
by families who had been made financially sophisticated by the growing 
inflation.
l^See my "International Financial Markets and U.S. Domestic Policy Since 
1946," in International Affairs, 1976. Also, C.A.E. Goodhart, "Structural 
Changes in the Banking System and the Determination of the Stock of Money," 
presented to the Conference on Western European Priorities," Brussels,
Decembr 1982, mimeo.
l^See Henry Kaufman, Complexities of U.S. Stabilization Policies in an 




























































































To fight this battle for a share of the fast-growing financial cake, 
large banks have resorted to the invention of means to increase their 
domestic competitiveness, like Certificates of Deposit, and to the 
exporting of more and more of their operations to the offshore money 
markets, where reserve requirements do not apply. At the same time they 
have tried to specialize in loans to genuine foreign borrowers.
In addition, they have been clamoring for the repeal of the New Deal 
Banking Legislation, and they have largely won the deregulation battle with 
the passage of the Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control 
Act of 1980, which treats all depository institutions on the same footing 
for what concerns reserve and other requirements.
As in 1928, the freeing of the domestic market in 1980, has induced 
American banks to expand their operation at home relative to their foreign 
loans. This in addition to the Federal Reserve restrictive policy, has 
meant a drastic reduction of their foreign lending. The sudden dearth o f 
funds thus induced has in turn placed the large banks' biggest foreign 
customers in near bankruptcy position. To relieve the situation, the 
Federal Reserve was compelled, in August 1982, to climb down from its 
restrictive stance, reducing interst rates. This brought about a stock 
market boom, and a revival of the domestic economy. But the attraction of 
a very high real interest rate remained, as prices slowed down, and as the 
main foreign countries tried to revive their economies by dropping interest 
rates in step with the United States. The resulting strength of the dollar 
has induced a huge balance of trade deficit.
The parallel with the end of the 1920's is inevitable. We are again 




























































































which has again changed the name of the game, the place where it is played, 
and the people who are made rich by playing it. The large money market 
banks have reacted to a domestic and international challenge with a 
behavior which, if it has helped them to keep heir market shares, has 
increased the instability of the U.S. financial system.
The Great American inflation, superimposed on the New Deal Banking 
legislation, has resulted in a complicated scramble for a very much 
expanded financial cake, with running battles between thrift institutions, 
large and small banks and non-bank financial intermediaries. The increase 
in anarchy was greatly facilitated by the great break-through in 
communication, achieved by the electronics revolution. And, as I said 
earlier, innovation is not necessarily by itself conducive to more order.
To retain their hold on the financial system, the American monetary 
authorities have been compelled to dangerously stretch the interst rates 
instrument. Historically interest rate policy is viable only if, by small 
changes, large results are obtained. If the oscillations become wide, 
history teaches us that direct control weapons have to be used.
We are now clearly at a watershed. But whether direct control will 
be resorted to before or after a disastrous financial crisis we shall learn 
before the end o f this year. Western financial history, however, teaches 
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